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Evaluation and Accuracy of Economic Forecasts 
Michael Groemling* 
Abstract: The economic forecasts for 2001 grossly missed 
reality. While forecasters estimated a growth rate of 3 per 
cent, real GDP actually grew by only 0.6 per cent. The 
analysis of forecasts in the years 1995 to 2001 shows never-
theless that they were fairly accurate. In addition, the article 
gives several arguments which may explain forecast errors: 
data revisions, unpredictable events, behavioural and politi-
cal feedback and imitation behaviour of forecasters. 
Justifying economic forecasts for the year 2001 brought a great deal of trouble 
with it. At the beginning of 2001 economists down the line expected real Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) in Germany to grow by around 3 per cent. In the 
course of the year all forecasts were revised downwards. Finally, real GDP 
grew only by 0.6 per cent.  
Such forecast errors can have far-reaching consequences for entrepreneurial 
decisions, economic policy and wage bargaining. For example, expected eco-
nomic growth is a component of productivity forecasts. Productivity growth in 
turn determines the bargaining margin. Thus, forecast errors can be misleading 
for wage settlements, and this again may have severe consequences for future 
labour demand. Table 1 shows to what extent the expected productivity growth 
for Germany in 2000 and 2001 diverged from the actual one according to the 
forecasts by the German Council of Economic Experts (Sachverständigenrat 
zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, SVR), the Associa-
tion of Economic Research Institutes (Arbeitsgemeinschaft deutscher wirt-
schaftswissenschaftlicher Forschungs-institute, Institute) and the Cologne Insti-
tute for Business Research (Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln, IW). 
 
                                                          
*  Address all communications to Michael Groemling, Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln, 
Gustav-Heinemann-Ufer 84-88, D-50968 Köln. E-Mail: groemling@iwkoeln.de. 
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Table 1: Productivity Forecasts for Germany 
 
Real GDP per employee   
Percentage change from previous period   
     
  Forecast  Actual Value 
 SVR Institute IW  
2000 2,4 2,4 2,0 1,4 
2001 1,8 1,7 1,7 0,4 
Annual Average 2,1 2,1 1,9 0,9 
     
SVR: German Council of Economic Experts   
Institute: Association of Economic Research Institutes  
IW: Cologne Institute for Business Research  
  
Source: Groemling, 2002  
 
The shortcomings of productivity forecasts for the last two years can be ex-
plained to a large degree by errors in forecasting real GDP growth (Groemling, 
2002). For the years 2000 and 2001, growth predictions ran up to an annual 
average of 2.8 per cent. Finally, the actual growth rate was 1 percentage point 
lower.  
This article will show the purpose of economic forecasts, the accuracy of the 
forecasts by the IW and, finally, what justifiable reasons there are for forecast 
errors. 
The meaning and purpose of economic forecasting is to gain information 
about the future development of an economy. Forecasts generally cover the 
development in the current and following year.  
- On the one hand, predictions are expected to gauge the magnitude of 
the future growth rate, in particular the growth rate of real GDP.  
- On the other hand, forecasts are expected to state whether there will be 
a cyclical turning point. That means that it should foresee a recession or 
a recovery. 
In evaluating the predictive performance of forecasts one has to keep in 
mind that economic predictions are as-if statements. They are based on certain 
assumptions about future economic and political conditions and data. Such 
forecasts are labelled conditional predictions. The predicted path of develop-
ment is determined by the level of information at the time of forecasting. Fore-
casts are efficient or rational, provided that all relevant and available informa-
tion are used (Nordhaus, 1987). Contrary to scenarios, economic forecasts only 
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point out that upcoming growth path with the highest probability. Again one 
has to keep in mind that the purpose of a forecast is to reduce uncertainty, not 
to eliminate it.  
Modern forecasting techniques differ from ancient prophecies in so far as 
they are based on scientific methods and that they can be traced and can be 
evaluated by other forecasters or, in particular, the users. Everyone who knows 
the relevant forecasting techniques and who is provided with the necessary data 
should be able to evaluate a certain prediction. The purpose of a forecast, the 
available data, the computing capacities and, of course, the preferred time 
consumption to do the forecast determines the kind of method that will be 
chosen. But to choose one method does not exclude the application of others – 
for example, to check results or to support parts of the forecast. Aside from 
econometric methods, such as simple regression models, structural models and 
time-series models, most forecasters still use so-called iterative forecasting 
techniques.  
The annual forecasts by the IW are produced in September for the following 
year and there are occasional revisions in the course of the following year. The 
Association of Economic Research Institutes (Institute) publishes ist semi-
annual forecasts in April and October, and the German Council of Economic 
Experts (SVR) publishes its annual forecast in November. The underlying 
method of the IW-forecasts is the iterative forecasting technique, or the formal 
SNA forecasting technique, where SNA stands for System of National Ac-
counts. It is based on the three approaches to analyse GDP: the expenditure, the 
output and the income approach. The expenditure approach reflects GDP by 
type of expenditure (e.g. private consumption, gross fixed capital formation, 
exports, imports). The output approach views the total gross value added by 
industries (e.g. manufacturing, construction, services), and the income ap-
proach covers compensation of employees, property and entrepreneurial in-
come. The first step is a forecast for each of these approaches. The second step 
is to bring the single forecasts into line. In order to get a consistent forecast of 
GDP, it is necessary to adjust the single forecasts. By means of the iterative 
forecasting technique the final prediction will be attained by moving step by 
step towards a consistent as well as the most probable version. 
One advantage of this forecasting method is its flexibility and relevance for 
reality. New information and special events (e.g. terror attacks, election out-
comes, regional crises in Asia or Russia) can be taken into account immedi-
ately. Special forecasts by experts – forecasts for certain types of expenditures 
or industries – and the results of business surveys or consultations can be in-
cluded. But this way of forecasting is said to be intransparent for others and 
prone to manipulations. This disadvantage may be diminished by explaining 
the underlying assumptions, conjectures and conditions, what makes the fore-
casted values and conclusions more comprehensive. Other forecasting tech-
niques allow an econometric control at any time.  
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After this short glance at the forecasting technique of the IW, we will now 
take a look at the forecasting accuracy since 1995. Figure 1 shows the predicted 
and actual growth rates of real GDP for Germany. The actual values are final 
rates (except for 2001). From 1999 onwards they are based on the revised 
European System of Accounts (ESA 1995). The forecasts for 1999 were based 
on the unrevised SNA, but actual values are only available from the revised 
version. 
 
According to figure 1, there were only three major discrepancies (1995, 1996, 
2001) between the predicted and the actual values in the seven covered years. 
In three years (1997, 1998, 1999) the forecasts are well within the scope of 
tolerance. Normally a discrepancy of a quarter of a percentage point in both 
directions is in accordance with an accurate forecast. Figure 2 also shows the 
forecasts by the Institute. The IW-forecasts compare well with those of the 
Institute. In 1995, 1996 and 2001 both institutions missed reality. Even in the 
successful forecasting years there are no pronounced differences. 
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The accuracy of the IW-forecasts is also illustrated in the scatter diagram relat-
ing predictions to actual values (Mincer/Zarnowitz, 1969). Points on the 45°-
line, the line of perfect forecasts, mean that forecasted and realized values are 
identical. A regression R = a + b*P, relating expected values (P) to realized 
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Figure  2 : Forecasts by IW and Institute and Actual Values 
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values (R), would have the following parameters in the case of a perfect fore-
cast: a = 0 and b = 1. Such a regression line would be equivalent with the line 
of perfect forecasts (45°-line). Looking at the forecasts for Germany in 1995 up 
to 2001 there is a pronounced gap to those values: a = 2.4 and b = -0.2.  
The prediction-realization diagram shows once again, which forecasts are 
more or less accurate. Deviations above (below) the 45°-line mean that the 
growth rate of GDP was overestimated (underestimated). Thus the IW-
forecasts show optimistic tendencies. With one exception the forecasted values 
were always higher than the actual ones. Moreover, according to figure 1, 2 and 
3, the predicted values fluctuate less than the actual outcomes. In other words, 
the forecasts were smoother than reality. In the period 1995 to 2001 the actual 
values ranged from 0.6 to 3 per cent, whereas the predicted values covered a 
range from 2 to 3 per cent only. A value for the parameter a in the regression of 
2.4 suggests, that the forecasts for these years expected an average value of this 
magnitude. 
In addition to this graphical analysis there are several measures to evaluate 
the accuracy of forecasts (Wallis, 1989; Stekler, 1991; Doepke/Langfeldt, 
1995): 
1) Mean error: ME = (1/n) Σ(P-R), where n is the number of observations 
(years), P is the predicted and R is the realized value. The mean error 
takes into account the sign of the annual forecasting error. It can be 
used to evaluate annual outcomes according to figure 1, 2 and 3. But 
this measure is not useful in determining the forecasting accuracy for 
more than one year, because positive and negative deviations compen-
sate each other. Therefore, the sum of annual deviations allows only 
limited conclusions. 
2) Mean absolute error: MAE = (1/n) Σ|P-R|. The mean absolute error 
solves the aggregation problem of the mean error. Positive and negative 
deviations do not compensate each other. Therefore the mean absolute 
error can be used to evaluate the sum of single deviations. 
3) Mean square error: MSE = (1/n) Σ(P-R)2. This also applies to the mean 
square error. This measure for the predictive performance attributes a 
higher weight to large forecasting errors.  
4) Standardized error: SE = 100*(MAE/SD), where SD is the standard de-
viation of R. The standardised forecasting error takes into account the 
fluctuations of the realized values (real GDP). Pronounced fluctuations 
of the actual outcomes bring about higher forecasting risks and there-
fore a higher probability of forecasting errors. 
Table 2 shows how well the IW did in comparison with other forecasting insti-
tutions in the period 1995 to 2001. Moreover, there is additional information 
for other time periods and for West Germany. 
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Table 2: Measures of Forecasting Accuracy 
        
Forecasting 
Institutions Source Area Time Period ME MAE MSE SE 
IW 
Groemling, 
2002 Germany 1995-2001 0,8 0,9 1,2 102 
Institute 
Groemling, 
2002 Germany 1995-2001 0,8 0,9 1,2 101 
SVR 
Groemling, 
2002 Germany 1995-2001 0,7 0,8 1,1 93 
For compari-
son:               
Institute Hinze, 1996 Germany 1992-1995 0,6 1,3 2,1 73 
Institute Hinze, 1996 
West-
Germany 1980-1990 -0,1 1,1 1,2 69 
SVR Hinze, 1996 
West-
Germany 1980-1990 0,1 0,9 1,0 56 
SVR Rinne, 1997 
West-
Germany 1975-1994 0,1 1,3 2,4 n.a. 
SVR 
Doepke/Lang-
feldt, 1995 
West-
Germany 1976-1994 -0,1 1,3 n.a. 64 
Institute 
Doepke/Lang-
feldt, 1995 
West-
Germany 1976-1994 -0,2 1,4 n.a. 70 
        
SVR: German Council of Economic Experts 
Institute: Association of Economic Research Institutes 
IW: Cologne Institute for Business Research 
ME: Mean Error; MAE: Mean Absolute Error; MSE: Mean Square Error; SE: 
Standardized Error 
 
Source: Groemling, 2002 
 
The mean error, a measure of limited usefulness, indicates no differences be-
tween the forecasts for the period 1995 to 2001 in Germany. However, it is 
higher than in earlier periods in all three forecasts. It must be kept in mind, that 
the latest period only covers seven years. The mean absolute error also shows 
no difference for the recent forecasts. It is even lower than for the forecasts for 
West Germany. Likewise the mean square error shows no pronounced differ-
ences. This error is today not larger than in former times. However, the stan-
dardised error is larger for the latest forecasts. According to this measure the 
forecasts by the SVR were more accurate than the forecasts by the Institute and 
the IW. 
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The quality of a forecast depends not only on how accurately it predicts 
GDP growth but also on whether it foresees turning points. Figure 4 shows to 
what extent the IW-forecasts predicted an acceleration or deceleration of the 
growth rate in the time period 1995 to 2001.  
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The columns in figure 4 show the change of the growth rate – not the growth 
rate itself – from the previous period in percentage points. It plots the change of 
the actual and predicted value from the actual outcome of the previous year. 
For example, the IW expected that the predicted growth rate of 3 per cent for 
1995 would exceed the actual growth rate for 1994 (2.7 per cent) by 0.3 per-
centage points. In fact, the actual growth rate for 1995 (1.2 per cent) fell below 
the actual growth rate of the previous year by 1.5 percentage points. Finally, 
figure 4 also shows that in six out of seven years the IW-forecasts did well in 
predicting an acceleration (1996, 1997, 1998, 2000) or a deceleration (1999 and 
2001). An error in forecasting a change happened in 1995 only. The extent of 
the change was predicted fairly accurately for 1997, 1998, 1999 and more or 
less for the year 2000. Although the direction of change was predicted correctly 
for 1996 and 2001, the forecasts failed to foresee the extent of the change.  
An additional measure to assess the informative quality of forecasts is given 
in table 3. The contingency table indicates whether the forecasts predicted the 
change of the growth rate correctly or not (Diebold/Lopez, 1996). The columns 
show the actual accelerations and decelerations, and the lines the predicted 
ones. Cell AA and BB mean that actual accelerations or decelerations were 
predicted correctly, whereas AB and BA indicate faulty forecasts. 
Figure 4 : Forecasted and Actual Changes 
changes of growth rates of real GDP from previous period, in  
percentage points,  
IW-forecasts for Germany, 1995 to 2001 
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Table 3: Contingency Table for Actual and Predicted Changes 
 Actual acceleration Actual deceleration 
Predicted acceleration AA AB 
Predicted deceleration BA BB 
 
In combination with table 3 there is a measure for the informative substance 
(IS) of a forecast (Doepke, 2000): IS = {(AA) / (AA + AB)} + {(BB) / (BB + 
BA)}. The values of this measure range from 0 to 2, with 0 meaning that no 
acceleration or deceleration was predicted correctly at all, and 2 meaning that 
all accelerations or decelerations were predicted correctly. If the measure is 1, 
it means that all cells of the contingency table are filled with the same number 
of observations. In this case the number of correct forecasts equals the number 
of erroneous ones. 
Figure 4 has already shown that four accelerations and two decelerations 
were predicted correctly. Only in 1995 the actual deceleration was not fore-
casted properly. Therefore cell AA contains four, cell BB two, and cell AB one 
observation. According to this result the measure IS takes a value of 1.8, which 
is close to the ideal grade of 2. For West Germany in the time period 1976 to 
1999 Doepke (2000) found out IS-values of 1.63 (forecasts by the German 
Institute for Economic Research – Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, 
DIW) and 1.39 (forecasts by the Kiel Institute of World Economics – Kieler 
Institut für Weltwirtschaft). However, it must be kept in mind that this analysis 
covers a longer time period, so that a comparison with the latest results is 
possible only to a limited degree.  
After assessing the quality of economic forecasts several arguments are pre-
sented which may explain forecast errors. 
1. Data revisions make forecasts prone to errors 
Forecasting errors are sometimes due to revisions of the underlying data. 
Subsequent revisions of official data change the statistical fundamentals of 
forecasts and make them prone to errors.  
The revision of the data for Germany´s GDP growth in the third quarter 
of 2000, for example, largely diminished the statistical carry-over for the 
year 2001. When forecasting for 2001 in autumn 2000 the preliminary 
growth rate for the third quarter 2000 was according to the official data sub-
stantially higher than later on. In the course of time it was revised down sev-
eral times by the Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt) – from 
0.6 per cent in November 2000 to 0.3 per cent in March 2001, and finally to 
0.1 per cent in August 2001. For that reason the statistical carry-over was 
halved to merely 0.5 per cent. This revision of data cannot explain the entire 
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forecasting error for 2001 (2.3 percentage points), but at least for half of a 
percentage point. For similar results see Nierhaus (2002). 
2. Unpredictable events make forecasts obsolete 
The extent of the forecasting error for Germany in 2001 can be explained to 
a large degree by the business slump of the U.S. economy and the loss of 
purchasing power due to inflation. Unforeseeable shocks, like excessive 
wage settlements (Germany 1995), overshooting exchange rates (Germany 
1995), natural disasters (e.g. earthquake in Japan 1995), country-specific 
crises (e.g. Mexiko 1995; Russia and Asia 1997), oil price shocks 
(2000/2001), animal epidemics (Europe 2000/2001), the hard landing of the 
U.S. economy (2001) and political shocks (terror attacks in the United States 
2001) contribute to invalidate forecasts. 
In addition to spreading more rapidly international shocks overthrow 
some forecasts faster nowadays.The velocity with which global events affect 
economies around the world has accelerated and has obviously been under-
estimated by forecasters. Apart from traditional trade relations, financial 
markets and multinational corporations are today important routes for 
transmitting global impulses. Business cycles in certain countries affect in-
vestment decisions of multinational firms directly and thus have a higher in-
fluence on business activities in other countries (Dalsgaard/Elmeskov/Park, 
2002). 
However, not all European economies have recently been affected in the 
same way by external shocks, although they are equally tied up in the 
international division of work (Beyfuß/Groemling, 2001). Germany was hit 
harder by external disruptions than other European countries. Its lacking 
flexibility to adjust to external and internal shocks is obviously the main 
reason for its higher susceptibility.  
3. Conditional forecasts ignore feed-back 
Most of the forecasts are conditional. They are based upon certain assump-
tions about the political situation and the economic behaviour of households 
and firms. Political conditions – for example, taxes and transfers – that pre-
vail at the time of forecasting are taken into account, of course. However, 
unforeseeable policy changes cannot be included. Political changes and their 
effects on growth may also be predicted but are more suitable for scenarios.  
Forecasting errors happen, in particular, if the forecast itself induces 
changes of political conditions or economic behaviour. Because economic 
agents react to forecasts, they influence whether the forecasted situation will 
happen or not:  
- On the one hand, predictions may unfold a momentum which fosters 
the predicted development (self-fulfilling prophecy). For example, a 
forecasted recession may aggravate the economic situation because in-
vestors or consumers cut down on expenditure. 
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- On the other hand, forecasts may set off reactions that destroy the fore-
cast. For example, a forecasted recession may trigger political pro-
grammes, that help to improve the economic situation and to avert the 
forecasted development. 
Obviously, the optimism to steer the economy through stabilization politics 
in the sixties and seventies of the last century coincided with the heyday of 
economic forecasting. 
4. Forecasters are human beings 
Forecasters often succeed in predicting an acceleration or deceleration of the 
growth rate. But the predictive power is often not sufficient enough to fore-
cast an absolute decrease of real GDP: „Recessions generally arrive before 
the forecast.“ (Loungani, 2001). There are at least two reasons to explain 
this: 
- Forecast smoothing 
Forecasters adjust their predictions slowly and in small steps only. As 
human beings generally adhere to the status quo, forecasters hold on to 
their present forecast. They may fear that large and, in particular, abrupt 
corrections confuse the users (Nordhaus, 1987). Fast and abrupt 
changes may be interpreted as inconsistency of the forecasters point of 
view or an exaggerated reaction on events of the day. 
- Forecast clustering 
In particular, in times of increased uncertainty forecast clusters seem to 
emerge. The forecasts gather around a consensus value. Imitation or 
herd behaviour of the forecasters leads to a convergence towards a 
common value (Loungani, 2001; Batchelor/Dua, 1992; Gallo/Granger/ 
Jeon, 2002). Particularly in the case when forecasters copy the latest 
forecasts of others, this imitation behaviour may result in a consensus 
that increasingly departs from reality. New information on the business 
situation will have less and less influence on the forecasts. Under cer-
tain circumstances forecasters may have a closer look on other forecasts 
than on economic fundamentals (Gallo/Granger/Jeon, 2002).  
Additionally, it is not easy for single forecasters to deviate from the „common 
sense“ of the forecasting community. According to the motto „Great minds 
think alike“ (Loungani, 2001) there may be pressure to converge or stick to the 
consensus. At best, well established forecasters may risk to abandon the herd 
(Lamont, 1995). In sum, a high conformity of forecasts is not necessarily proof 
of high clarity of the forecasts. 
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Figure 5-a : Highest and Lowest Forecasts for Germany for 2001 
predicted growth of real GDP for 2001 according to Consensus 
Forecasts, in percent 
 
 
Finally, figure 5 indicates that there is no clearcut evidence for imitation behav-
iour in the forecasts for Germany for 2001. Figure 5-a shows how the monthly 
growth predictions for 2001 have changed between January 2000 and Decem-
ber 2001. Not only the highest but also the lowest single forecasts, published 
monthly by Consensus Forecasts, are taken into account. According to figure 5-
a the forecasted growth rates for real GDP were reduced more and more in the 
Figure 5-b : Differences between Highest and Lowest Forecasts 
in percentage points 
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course of time. This, of course, might be attributed to the fact that the level of 
information improved as time passed by. Therefore, both, the highest and the 
lowest forecasts, were close to the actual outcome by the end of 2001, and there 
was no pronounced difference between them anymore. However figure 5-b 
shows that the difference between the highest and lowest monthly forecast did 
not decline continually. It was stable to a large degree during the first six 
months of 2001, but increased markedly in the middle of the year 2001. 
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